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PREFACE
This is the final report on the results of a conversation among
a group of prestigious Latin American and Caribbean
academics and practitioners who gathered in Miami, Florida
in November 2010 to review current regional affairs and
share their views on the main trends and challenges facing
2011 and beyond. The list of participants appears at the end
of this report. Rather than determining set conclusions,
participants offered a variety of appreciations and reflections
on Latin America and the Caribbean for the immediate and
medium-range future. Florida International University’s
Applied Research Center coordinated the event and
appreciates the contributions of all participants.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and
external conflicts prevalent in Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature.
Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires
hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and
trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and
organizations – represent major challenges to the region,
undermining several States’ already weak capacity to
govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained
resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering
what some States have not historically been able to provide –
elements of human security, opportunities for social
mobility, and basic survival.
Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)
are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas
of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition
for land routes and production areas. Cartels such a La
Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCCBrazil), among others, operate like trade and financial
enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources,
demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to
changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their
application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises.
The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central
America is now the most violent region in the world,
surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil
strife for years.
In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the
military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however,
but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement
capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will
challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the
course of their experience in government, or from the civil
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wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the
Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves
according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated
over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human
rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according
to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable
perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in
corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring
them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to
resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand”
can resolve national troubles.
The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within
the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap
between nations positioned to surpass their “developing
nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the
judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further
into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South
American nations are advancing their political and economic
development. Brazil in particular has realized macroeconomic stability, made impressive gains in poverty
reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant
oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power,
much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that
it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several
Central American States have become so structurally
deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that
their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled
and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly
vulnerable to DTO entrenchment.
In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business
also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the
growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime
and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face
greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs
and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also
3

faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal
rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable
leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform
its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the
economy while continuing to curtail citizens’ civil rights will
test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a
potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an
existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the
hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who
continues his attempts to bring the region together under
Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian”
anti-U.S. banner, without much success.
The environment and natural disasters will merit more
attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce
increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region
fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to
withstand such calamities and respond to their effects.
Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high,
particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing
rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a
potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources.
The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to
produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates.
Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are
lacking or openly violated with near impunity.
Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including
African descendants, in several Andean countries, are
particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural
resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to
protests against extraction activities that negatively affect
their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically
underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based
organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances
to the national political agenda, becoming more politically
engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s
4

chronically poor quality of education that has consistently
failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for
jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the
more vulnerable populations.
Simultaneously, the
educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of
access to information and freedom of the press.
The international panorama is also in flux. New security
entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of
South American Nations, The South American Defense
Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities
seem to be defying the Organization of American States and
its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And
the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable
Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other
actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for
Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in
the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined
than those of China.
Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by
LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the
preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their
economies. The increased extraction of raw material for
export will produce greater concern over the environmental
impact that is created by the exploitation of natural
resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove
counterproductive economically for countries in the region,
particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose
economic policies have long sought diversification from
dependence on commodities to the development of service
and technology based industries.
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THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STATE: RESILIENT,
TOLERANT, AND VULNERABLE
Regional observers have noted with satisfaction recent
economic indicators and public polling results, confirming
that Latin America has avoided the worst effects of the
global economic recession. The 2010 findings of the
AmericasBarometer (LAPOP) shows that while the poor
indeed were the most affected by the crisis, approximately
three-fourths of the region’s population retained their jobs,
and half reported no change in their household income. The
United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) places aggregate regional
growth for 2010 at 6 percent while estimating that growth in
the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay,
and Paraguay has ranged from as high as 7 to 9.7 percent. 1
LAPOP surveys show a majority of the LAC’s citizens to be
increasingly satisfied with their governments’ economic
performance, corresponding with the Santiago-based
Latinobarómetro’s findings that over half of the population
in Brazil, Panama, and Chile believe their respective
countries to be making socio-economic progress.2
Although poverty remains at levels higher than 20 percent of
the population in most Latin American countries, trends
indicate that the region is indeed making economic progress,
leading The Financial Times to declare that, “Poverty is no
longer what defines it; instead, it is the rising middle class.”3
Even income inequality, long the bane of the region’s socioeconomic development, and the source of much of its
historic political instability, has seen some improvements –
1

Bárcena, Alicia; Prado, Antonio; Kacef, Osvaldo; Malchik, Susana;
“Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean,”
Pg. 9, The United Nations, December 2010.
2
“The Latinobarómetro Poll: The Democratic Routine,” The Economist,
December 2nd, 2010.
3
Rathbone, John Paul, “Latin America: No Longer the Man with a Moustache
and a Guitar,” The Financial Times, November 22nd, 2010.
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particularly in Ecuador, Paraguay, and Brazil – although the
region as a whole remains the most unequal in the world.4
This net economic progress has also led to positive
implications for the region’s democracy, reports LAPOP.
Macroeconomic stability may have prevented not only a
more serious economic crisis, but also a region-wide decline
in political legitimacy, and perhaps even threats to the
consolidation of the democratic regime. More broadly
speaking, surveys indicated that democratic attitudes, and the
legitimacy of the political system itself, have turned out to be
surprisingly resilient, with 69.8 per cent of the region in
support of democracy.
Furthermore, Latin America has become more tolerant.
When LAPOP asked citizens whether government critics –
those criticizing either an incumbent government, its
policies, or the political system as a whole – should be
allowed to vote, conduct peaceful demonstrations, run for
public office, and give speeches on television, approximately
55 percent of the region indicated approval. 5 This trend
towards tolerance and openness to new ideas have had a
correlating effect on Latin American economics, translating
into mixed approaches that include both State regulation and
greater integration into the international global economy.
This heterodox conception is expressed by former Brazilian
President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, who has spoken of the
need for the State “to intervene when the market fails,” yet
he too would be counted amongst the 71 percent of Latin
Americans that believe “private enterprise is essential for
[their] country’s development.”6

4

“Societies on the Move,” The Economist, September 9th, 2010.
Ibid., Slides 47 and 48.
6
“Lula’s Legacy,” The Economist, September 30th, 2010; “The Latinobarómetro
Poll: The Democratic Routine,” The Economist, December 2nd, 2010.
5
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Despite these positive political and economic trends,
however, Latin America remains politically vulnerable. This
is especially salient when analyzing the combination of
political tolerance and system support as indications of
“democracy at risk.” Haiti tops the list among 26 countries
analyzed as having its democratic regime most at risk. It is
followed, unexpectedly perhaps, by Peru and Paraguay. At
the bottom of the list are Costa Rica and Uruguay,
maintaining their historical positions as the region’s most
stable democracies. As a whole, growing public insecurity –
as seen in the proliferation of violence, gangs, corruption,
and the States’ inability to provide protection – is
diminishing support for democracy.
Also, the region’s economic success is largely based on
mineral exports fueled by high commodity prices. Peru’s 8.6
percent growth rate can largely be attributed to the high
prices for gold, silver, copper, and zinc sales in the
international market.7 The source for these high prices has
largely been China’s seemingly insatiable demand for
agricultural products and minerals, which has made the
Asian giant, rather than the U.S., Brazil’s number one
trading partner.8 Both are emblematic of the larger, regionwide phenomenon that Latin America is still – as it has been
throughout its history – dependent on raw material exports.
The region’s lack of innovation and disregard for intellectual
property rights only strengthen this claim. Finding an
alternative path to this dependence is crucial to Latin
America’s long-term political and socio-economic prospects,
and can only be truly and fundamentally addressed through
improvements in education.

7

Bárcena, Alicia; Prado, Antonio; Kacef, Osvaldo; Malchik, Susana; op.cit.;
Oppenheimer, Andrés, “Peru May Be Region’s Next Success Story,” The Miami
Herald , October 14th, 2010.
8
Lopez, Luciana, “BRIC Breaking: Brazil’s China Syndrome,” Reuters,
September 24th, 2010.
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Education has become the Achilles’ heel of Latin American
development. Aside from some occasional exceptions,9
schools from pre-school to graduate school levels provide
low-quality education that fail to meet the needs of countries
and students and prepare them for a competitive global
economy. Students are finishing at the bottom in nearly all
global student achievement tests, and when it comes to
science in particular, students are receiving marks that lie at
or below the lowest levels possible. According to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), these scores indicate that the societies in question
will not be able to participate actively in science and
technology industries or related industrial trends and events.
This negative economic assessment of the region’s education
systems is surpassed only by the social implications, as LAC
schools do little to reduce inequality. Poor children tend to
begin school later in age, fail and repeat more grades, drop
out sooner, and score lower on standardized tests than their
more affluent peers, regardless of their gender, race,
ethnicity, or area of residence. Children of the rich attend
well-funded private schools of reasonable quality, while the
poor receive third-rate education in underfunded and poorly
managed public schools. University level education in the
region also suffers from the paradox of having the most
affluent attend State-funded institutions – because they meet
the grade and exam based criteria for admittance and attend
for free or reduced tuition – while poor students, whose
economic situation the State system was designed for, cannot
gain admittance because of their inability to fulfill the exam
entrance requirements, perpetuating the regional educational
crisis.
LAC government social spending also paradoxically tends to
benefit the richest part of the population more than the
9

Brazil has become a leader in tropical medicine, biofuel, and food crop PhD
research.
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poorest. In several countries, for example, 80 percent of
social security benefits go to the wealthiest 40 percent of the
population, and only 3 percent go to the poorest 10 percent.
The size of informal economies – more than 40 percent in
many Latin American countries – reduces both productivity
growth and fiscal revenues, and is largely caused by
government bureaucracy and an inability to effectively tax
revenues. A lack of sensible fiscal policies means that tax
burdens are increasingly placed on the middle class. Finally,
the practice of taxing capital and land very lightly to promote
investment, while taxing labor very heavily, leads to growth
that fails to generate a significant amount of jobs – resulting
in growing inequality and dependence on illegal and
informal economies for many.
Vulnerable populations are usually the most affected by the
inequalities in society. And because of where they often
live, they are increasingly impacted by issues such as
environmental degradation, land use and tenure issues, and
the effects from the exploitation of natural resources.
Indigenous and marginalized groups have responded with
growing protests, particularly in the Andean countries,
creating socially and ethnically-based organizations to gain
political influence. Such groups have reached national power
in Bolivia and the rights of indigenous people have indeed
expanded under the presidency of Evo Morales, whose
policies are contributing to Bolivians’ realization of the need
for a more integrated society. Yet, most other countries still
fail to even incorporate the rights of indigenous populations
in their constitutions.
Repeated judicial and constitutional reforms have created
many ambiguous laws and precedents subject to political
influence and interpretation, often criticized for creating
conditions of legal impunity for many individuals. The
inability or unwillingness of the legal systems in most
countries to eliminate or reduce impunity has contributed to
10

the growing distrust by citizens in their legal institutions.
Corruption in the judicial systems often denies access to
justice to large segments of populations – while in some
countries the judicial systems are completely defunct. The
exceedingly poor quality of corrections systems has
essentially created universities for criminals to learn how to
perfect their illegal practices and living nightmares for the
innocent.
Finally, the region has seen a setback in press freedom.
There is growing soft and hard censorship, including the
intimidation and even assassination of journalists in several
countries. Relations between the media and the State have
deteriorated through the region, and there is a growing
concentration of media ownership in few hands.
A
foreboding legal environment is emerging through laws
designed to weaken freedom of information through the
censorship of media outlets and the limitation of access to
media sources. This has coincided with the perception that
news coverage is failing to adequately address the challenges
and issues (environment, health, and rural issues) faced by
citizens in many countries. All of these are factors that
affect the quality of democracy, as they leave the public
uninformed and unable to address their grievances and
claims in the public forum of ideas, ultimately reducing their
faith in democratic systems of government.
NATURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
The bi-continental expanse of Latin America and the
Caribbean contains areas highly susceptible to the effects of
natural disasters. 2010 gave two examples of contrasting
experiences with Haiti and Chile in the level of damage and
the capacity to recover from their earthquakes. The ultimate
lesson learned was that the least developed the country, the
greater the impact of the destruction and scale of the disaster.
Both cases also illustrated the need for the immediate
11

reestablishment of national authority and the continuity of
government following a natural disaster.
Environmental risks that can lead to disasters are also present
in the region. Continued deforestation of the Amazon would
likely compound global warming, potentially leading to
droughts across large portions of Latin America. This would
have devastating effects on food production from Argentina
to Brazil, as well as lead to the collapse of some of the most
Cross-sector
bio-diverse ecosystems in the world.
competition for water resources exists between power,
agriculture, industry, and drinking water. More than 100
dams are being built throughout the region, affecting local
residential access to water resources, and often exacerbating
existing border disputes. There are also concerns with the
spread of communicable diseases, as migration increases to
city slums that lack potable water and sanitation. Population
pressures in cities are presenting higher risks of
infrastructure deterioration, while insufficient attention to
technical trades – such as training electricians and mechanics
– also places at risk the ability of some nations to maintain
electrical grids and water and sanitation infrastructures. The
lack of appropriate infrastructures again reinforces citizens’
perception that governments cannot even provide basic
services in exchange for their political support.
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES TRANSFORM THE REGION
Among the most prevailing challenges reshaping the security
agenda in LAC is the rise of illicit activity, namely narcotics
trafficking.
This activity has historically resided in
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. However, globalization has
drastically enhanced illicit traffickers’ ability to adjust to
pressures from international law enforcement agencies,
moving people and goods across borders with relative ease.
It has also enabled the creation of new markets in developing
countries, increasing demand. For example, over the past
12

four years there has been a 30 percent decrease in cocaine
reaching the U.S., but there has been an upsurge in drugtrafficking through South America. This is a result of an
increase in alternative transshipment routes from Colombia,
Bolivia, and Peru to Brazil and Argentina to final
destinations in Africa and Europe. Portions of these
shipments remain in South America during transit,
particularly because Brazil and Argentina have become
major drug-consuming markets.
Central America remains the major corridor for drugs
reaching the U.S and Canada. From Panama to Guatemala
the presence of DTOs has dramatically increased, many
seeking to escape the pressures of Colombian and Mexican
counter-drug initiatives. The States’ inability to address their
persistent socio-political and economic challenges – and
their lack of interest in and capacity to address criminality
even unrelated to drug trafficking – makes their societies
extremely vulnerable to the effects of these DTOs. For
example, violence is on the rise in the northern triangle –
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras – a region that has
already been dubbed by the UN Development Program as the
most violent region in the world, in large part because of the
region’s civil wars of the 1980’s, the corruption and abuse of
law enforcement prominent within its countries, the resulting
alienation of large segments of its societies, and the rise of
large and violent gangs known as maras . The Caribbean
now has the world’s second highest per capita murder rate.
And nearly half of Latin Americans polled feel “very unsafe”
(LAPOP), to the extent that concerns over crime have
increasingly surpassed those of unemployment since 2008
(Latinobarómetro ).10
While powerful DTOs are indeed challenging the States’
ability to govern effectively, many such States have long
10

“The Latinobarómetro Poll: The Democratic Routine,” The Economist,
December 2nd, 2010.
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been governed ineffectively. Therefore, in some cases, the
loyalty of local populations has shifted from governments to
criminal organizations, often in localities where the latter is
more able to provide basic services and security for the
community, often leading to incidents where citizens are
protecting drug-lords. This was made evident in Jamaica in
2010 – when citizens attempted to protect Christopher
“Dudus” Coke from local law enforcement authorities that
sought to extradite him to the U.S. – and has also been
common in Colombia’s rural areas, Rio de Janeiro’s favelas,
and across Haiti before and after the 2010 earthquake.
The growing crime and insecurity and the inability of LAC
States to effectively resist it is leading to the privatization of
traditional government security functions. Across Central
America and the Caribbean, private security companies are
being sought to step in and attempt to provide basic security
services to fill the State’s capacity deficit. Such companies
are often better equipped and trained than national and local
police forces and employ current and former military and
law enforcement officials. However, they also display the
same problems that plague public institutions, sometimes
moonlighting as paramilitaries and committing crimes while
ostensibly combating other criminal groups. Rio de Janeiro
and numerous cities in Colombia provide prime examples
where ineffectively demobilized paramilitaries have
rebranded themselves as private security companies, but
remain as predatory, violent, and pernicious as ever.
Ultimately, the trend towards criminal activity and the
corresponding increase in the use of private security
companies will likely continue to reduce the State’s
monopoly on law enforcement.
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LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES: RETURNING FROM
THE BARRACKS?
Neither military nor police can act as sole executor of
citizen security
As comparisons are increasingly made between today’s
Central American drug cartels and those of Colombia two
decades prior, there might be more calls for the military,
security, and law enforcement institutions to single-handedly
“solve the problem.” However, Mexico’s experience alone
shows the ineffectiveness of this approach. Approximately
45,000 troops and thousands of federal law enforcement
officers have been deployed since 2006 to combat the
nation’s DTOs – a dual-approach being taken because
Mexico’s weak and corrupt police force had initially proved
itself unfit for the task – yet these federal deployments have
failed to significantly reduce drug-related violence, as more
than 30,000 people died over the four years since the federal
government began its anti-DTO campaign.11 In other
countries, corruption within the military and police is so
widespread that neither group can be relied upon to establish
or reestablish citizen security. And additional calls for
combining the two forces may simply garner military-police
conflicts.
At the regional level, combined U.S.-Latin American
counter-drug efforts must move beyond their focus on
interdiction and punishment. Since the 1980’s, it has been
demonstrated that these initiatives deal with only the effects
of the problems, and in many cases exacerbate them. For
example, prisons in the U.S and Central America have been
known to serve as training and recruitment centers that
actually enhance the ability of organized crime to maintain
11

“Mexico Bodies Found After Shoot Out with Police,” The Telegraph, August
26th, 2010; “Mexico’s Drug War: Number of Dead Passes 30,000,” BBC,
December 16th, 2010.
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its cohesion. Therefore, regional efforts must become more
holistic in nature and address fundamental sources of
instability, particularly by promoting legal, intelligence, and
social welfare reform.
On the national and local levels, governments might do well
to perform the following:
1. Commit to multi-dimensional police reform that includes
continued education, a dignified wage, preparation for
various police units and tactics, and a demand for principled
conduct (i.e., no tolerance for corruption, extortion, or abuse
of power).
2. Reassert State presence in “alternatively governed
spaces” (AGS’s). While this is often achieved through
military or militarized-police force, regard for human rights
must be a governing principle within such operations.
3. Maintain the State’s subsequent presence (“seize and
hold”) through the presence of regular law enforcement and
security forces, or through topos / “ground hog” units. A
topo unit consists of a 10-member squad that carries both
revolvers and high-caliber rifles and patrols areas at frequent
intervals.
4. Regain citizen trust through “community policing,”
“rotational policing,” or a combination of the two. The idea
of local, permanent police forces is appealing, because one
can get to know his or her protector. However, local officers
have also been known to make friends with the local
criminals, provoking calls for rotational police units.
5. Expand citizens’ access to justice, support for the rule of
law, and human rights to address LAC’s crisis of impunity.
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6. Implement prison reform that provides additional building
capacity, more secure facilities that effectively cut inmates’
ties to outside criminal groups, and holistic rehabilitation
programs that re-integrate prisoners with society when it is
deemed safe and responsible to do so.
7. Create opportunities for legal employment while
simultaneously increasing the State’s capacity to render
services such as water, electricity, health care, and improved
education to affected communities.
8. Encourage community involvement to give citizens a new
stake in a common future, and to create new spaces for social
capital to emerge.
As a whole, information is crucial to fighting crime
effectively. There is a need for reliable indicators, as well as
public data on individuals, to help governments and
companies conduct investigative work. Information sharing
is also key and could perhaps be improved by bringing interagency models to Latin America. Characteristics of crime
organizations also need to be better understood. While small
gangs need to be dismantled, going after larger criminal
organizations may continue to be a better strategy,
particularly because larger organizations are the ones that are
increasing utilizing these small gangs. Furthermore, not all
organizations conduct the same types of activities, making it
necessary to discriminate their functions for more effective
responses.
PART OF THE PROBLEM RATHER THAN THE
SOLUTION?
Large-scale revenue-driven military corruption is eroding the
containment of illicit activities. Recent investigative news
reports appear to indicate diverse scenarios where corrupt
military actors have found new ways of securing consistent
17

illegal sources of income. While isolated incidents of
bribery, illegal arms sales, kidnapping, drug-trafficking,
money-laundering, and robbery can be found amongst
various military personnel across the region, other scenarios
appear to be offering steady sources of illegal revenue, and
to therefore be more characteristic of large-scale,
institutional corruption.
Border guards within the
Dominican Republic’s Specialized Border Security Corps, or
CESFRONT, for example, are accused of regularly accepting
bribes to overlook the trafficking of Haitian children into
their country. In Venezuela, the recently captured drugtrafficker Walid Makled claims to have intermittently paid as
many as fifteen Venezuelan generals to both protect him and
usher drug shipments through the Caracas Maiquetía
airport.12
More research is needed to see how corruption is organized
within the ranks; whether it is the result of individual
soldiers or officers acting on their own, or if it is limited to
specific units or stratified hierarchically within the military
structure. These elements would contribute to a better
understanding of knowing when trust might be an issue when
dealing with military institutions. It would also assist in
identifying areas that need strengthened, such as offices of
Inspector Generals, codes of ethics, procurement and
contracting processes, forensic abilities, and more. As for
U.S., it could do its part by making military assistance
contingent upon greater transparency and accountability on
how the institutions and their senior officials are funded.
A NEW ROLE FOR THE MILITARY?
The increased use of the military as a police force, growing
expenditures, and new cases of large-scale revenue-driven
12

“Walid Makled Hace Nuevas Revelaciones: ‘Los Militares Me Protegieron,’”
El Nacional, November 14th, 2010; “El Hombre Que Sabe Demasiado,” Semana,
November 6th, 2010.
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corruption call for not only a reassessment of Latin
American military powers, but perhaps also a new directive
that could make better use of Armed Forces energies. For
example, Brazilian, Colombian, and U.S. militaries all came
to the aid of Haiti after the destructive 7.0-scale earthquake
hit the country on January 12, 2010. 13 One month later,
approximately 10,000 Chilean troops acted as “firstresponders” to their own country’s 8.8-magnitude
earthquake, successfully restoring order to communities
affected by panic and looting.14
Such international and domestic military response skills
could be promoted as a template for other Latin American
militaries and perhaps even institutionalized. A regional
multinational response force could even be created.
Militaries often bear equipment, organizational structures,
and rapid-response capacities that other domestic actors lack.
Brought under the directive of natural disaster response,
militaries could better serve their resource-strapped
governments in moments of crisis and further reinforce their
value and service to democratic governments. However,
should such mandates ultimately be enacted, it will require
that a certain percentage of traditional conventional arms
purchases be re-directed towards disaster-response
equipment, a move likely to garner various degrees of
contestation and support.
INFLUENCE IN FLUX
Latin America and the Caribbean face transnational and
multi-dimensional challenges that surpass the capacity of
either the U.S. or any other single State. However, while
over the past decade the U.S.’ attention has focused on areas
outside of Latin America – with the exception of Colombia –
13

Mora, Frank O., “The Top 7 Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the
Americas,” Pg. 7, University of Miami, April 29th, 2010.
14
“Counting the Cost; Chile’s Earthquake,” The Economist, March 6th, 2010.
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there has been an increasing consensus that it must reengage
the region.
The state of the West remains critical to Latin America. The
most significant threat to the stability, security, prosperity
and welfare of the region for the next few years may be the
prospect of deepening recession and eventual inflation in the
U.S., Europe, and in the global economy in general.
Furthermore, there is the possibility of growing tensions
among the G-8 and G-20 nations on how to manage the
world economy, which could lead to the outbreak of
currency manipulations and protectionist policies. Latin
America may not be so much a source of economic
instability as it is a likely victim of it in the era of
globalization.
New foreign powers – as other nations have done in the past
– are securing natural resources in LAC. China, Iran,
Russia, and perhaps soon India, covet the region’s oil,
lithium, uranium, and other valuable resources. The nature
of Chinese and Iranian relations can best be understood by
their respective key partnerships in Latin America: China’s
strong economic relations with Brazil and Iran’s ideological
engagement with Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and
Bolivia. There is also a sense of competition with the U.S. in
terms of who will have preferential access to these resources,
from sources of alternative energy to sources critical to new
technologies – particularly in the case of lithium.
Within the region, Brazil represents the most determined
regional and international actor. Mexico’s internal drug
violence has limited its ability to play a significant role in
LAC. Cuba’s new leadership is more concerned with
domestic rather than foreign issues and instead, it is relying
on Venezuela to carry the anti-American banner. However,
Venezuela’s capacity to maintain its own level of influence
seems to have peaked, as it faces profound internal political
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and economic crises.
Simultaneously, other regional
countries that could utilize sufficient political and economic
leverage to increase their influence, like Chile, apparently
have concluded that it is not in their interests to do so.
BRAZIL: ARE WE THERE YET?
As China did in 2008, Brazil is preparing to make an
unprecedented statement to the world that it has finally
entered the ranks of the global powers in the 21st century,
hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Summer
Olympics in 2016. Oil and gas discoveries from 2007 and
2008, if estimates are correct, will make Brazil a major
energy producer, enhancing its regional and international
influence. Brazil has steadily increased its role in both the
hemisphere and the international community in pursuit of its
aspirations, yet it seems uncertain on how to project its role
as an emerging power. While the “Lula Model” of moderate
left politics is more appealing than the strident policies of
some of its neighbors, Brazil still has no real development
model to offer. Nor has it completely defined its relationship
with the U.S.
Brazil and the U.S. share a commitment to democracy, and a
desire for regional stability, but may increasingly differ on
other issues. Brazil desires a deeper bilateral relationship
with the U.S. – similar to that which has been developed
with India – yet there is no clear indication of what a BrazilU.S. partnership would look like. Brazil is a key player in
both the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and
the South American Defense Council, South America’s two
newest multilateral security organizations. And its military
has played major roles in the Haitian peacekeeping
operations before and after the 2010 earthquake. It is in the
U.S. interest to collaborate with Brazil and the new regional
security entities and to avoid repeating its delay in
recognizing MERCOSUR when it was created in the 1990s.
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The Brazilian military has long resisted cooperation with the
U.S. on counternarcotics efforts. However, now that Brazil
is facing increased flows of drug traffic, new opportunities
for collaboration may exist. For example, the U.S. could
oversee technology transfers that would place new druginterdiction radar systems into the Amazon. Similarly,
Brazilian efforts in eradicating drug lords from the favelas in
Rio de Janeiro and other main cities could provide additional
lessons learned when it comes to community policy, fighting
organized crime, combating drug and arms trafficking, and
understanding the pernicious effects of local corruption and
private security organizations. Brazil could even use such
knowledge to support Mexico’s anti-DTO offensive, an
initiative that could both assist a fellow LAC nation and
enhance its regional leadership simultaneously.
VENEZUELAN INFLUENCE UNRAVELING?
Despite anticipation that President Hugo Chávez’s regionwide vision of 21st Century Socialism might strengthen and
spread, it appears to be gaining no new followers in the
region. The ousting of Honduras’ President Manuel Zelaya
in 2009 seems to have tempered enthusiasm for Venezuelan
anti-Americanism rhetoric in Latin America. Yet, the
Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América
(ALBA, Spanish acronym for Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas) has provided significant economic assistance to
several member and observer States, particularly in the
Caribbean. Because of its close link to the Venezuelan
economy, the very success of ALBA is dependent on
continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices, and the
ability of Chavez to manage internal political challenges.

22

CHINA CONTINUES TO DEEPEN IT’S PRESENCE
Generally speaking, China-Latin American relations have
largely been driven by economic considerations, primarily
access to markets and resources. China’s trade with the
region reached US$121.5 billion in 2009, and trade between
China and Brazil increased 12-fold between 2001 and 2009,
making it Brazil’s largest commercial partner. China will
displace the European Union as the region's second-largest
trading partner by the middle of 2011. Though slow to
materialize, Chinese investments in Latin America are now
in the billions, with several major deals having come about
over the last few years, i.e. US$28 billion in loans to
Venezuela, with another US$16 billion committed to oil
exploration in the Orinoco; US$10 billion to Argentina to
modernize its rail system, and US$3.1 billion to purchase the
Argentine oil company BRIDAS; a US$1 billion advance
payment to Ecuador in exchange for petroleum; US$4.4
billion committed to Peru; and almost US$20 billion to
Brazil in exchange for of oil and steel.15 Indeed, it is China’s
economic engagement in Latin America that both offset the
global economic crisis of 2008 and helped solidify its
influence throughout the region.16
IRANIAN AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCES REMAIN
M ARGINAL
Latin America and the Caribbean has seen an increase in an
Iranian foreign policy that engages populist, less democratic
governments such as Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua,
and Ecuador and follows a more ideological, anti-American
discourse as the only principle uniting this extraordinary
coalition. Hugo Chavez, Iran’s biggest ally in the region, has
15

Ellis, R. Evan. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”,
National Defense University Press, Issue 60, 1st quarter 2010.
16
One important exception to China’s trade with the region is Mexico, which
sees China as a competitor to U.S. markets access.
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helped foster and/or strengthen these relationships. Iran has
also engaged Brazil and Mexico, though with much less
success. Iran seems to be seeking international alliances to
overcome years of UN sanctions and international pressures
that have countered its pursuit of nuclear power. Iran’s
economic activities in the region have increased, particularly
in Venezuela, where it has signed more than 20 cooperative
agreements in recent years. Economic ties between Iran and
Latin America are marginal and less viable than those of
China and Russia, and many of Iran’s financial commitments
have not been realized. More recently, there have been
allegations that Iran is seeking uranium in Venezuela, though
this has not been confirmed. To date, there are no known
significant uranium deposits in Venezuela. However, such
deposits do exist in neighboring Guyana. Nonetheless, in the
context of influence, if Venezuelan influence is stagnating
then Iran will find it difficult to maintain long-term relations
in LAC.
In the past few years Russia has also increased its ties with
Latin America, notably through an increase in arms sales that
jumped 900 percent between the time periods of 1999-2003
Russia also signed nuclear-related
and 2004-2008.17
memoranda with several Latin American countries in 2009,
including Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Despite these
activities, however, Russian influence remains relatively low
when compared to that of the U.S. and China.
DOES THE U.S. STILL LEAD?
Despite the growing presence of China, and the fact that the
U.S. has over time decreased its own engagement with LAC,
the U.S. remains the most influential actor within the
Western Hemisphere. Trade between the U.S. and LAC
countries totaled just over US$500 billion in 2009, a
17

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009.
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significant increase from the 2004 figure of US$427
billion.18 And although China has greatly increased its own
regional trade, U.S. trade is still four times greater –
affording the U.S. a much larger economic footprint, as well
as the ability to wield greater influence. Culturally, LAC
societies have greater linkages with the U.S. than any other
country outside of the hemisphere. Politically, the U.S.’
commitment to the promotion of democracy and human
rights remains relevant to the claims and aspirations of LAC
societies. The U.S. also continues to enjoy positive popular
perceptions within the region. In 2010, U.S. leadership
approval ratings were as high as 62 percent in Chile and El
Salvador, 58 percent in Colombia, and 50 percent in Peru. In
countries where governments promote anti-American
policies, perceptions were still relatively high: Nicaragua,
Bolivia, and Venezuela featured approval ratings of 40
percent and Ecuador, 44 percent.19
U.S.-LAC military-to-military relations remain strong, even
if U.S. military policies are often viewed with suspicion, as
demonstrated by the support for President Rafael Correa’s
decision not to renew a U.S. military lease in Manta,
Ecuador, and the region-wide controversy over a 2009
proposal to allow the U.S. to use Colombian military bases.
In 2010, Brazil signed its first major military agreement with
the U.S. since 1977, providing “for cooperation in research
and development, information exchanges, and [a relationship
that] allows for joint military exercises and training.” 20 Later
18

Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. “Latin America in 2010:
Opportunities, Challenges and the Future of the U.S. Policy in the Hemisphere,”
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Gallup, “U.S. Leadership Ratings Suffer In Latin America: Approval Still up
from Brush Era,” December 10, 2010.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/145127/leadership-ratings-suffer-latinamerica.aspx?version=print.
20
Cárdenas, Mauricio, and de Castro Neves, João Augusto. “Brazil and the
United States: A New Beginning?” Brookings Institution, April 19, 2010.
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0419_us_brazil_cardenas.aspx.
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that year, the U.S. and Peru renewed a commitment to joint
military engagement.21
Opportunities and challenges still remain for the U.S. to
deepen its relationship with LAC. Such engagement must be
focused and sustained, with an emphasis on thinking
preventively and in partnership with LAC. Strategic
partnerships – particularly those with Brazil and Mexico –
should be cultivated, and increased attention paid to the
weak States and the illicit activities that plague the Central
American region.
In essence, the U.S. remains an
appreciated conflict resolution resource for the region.
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Andina. “Peru, U.S. Renew Military Cooperation”, Agencia Peruana de
Noticias, August 3, 2010.
http://www.andina.com.pe/Ingles/Noticia.aspx?Id=Qh86BvHC5ew=.
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